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Abstract: That displaced workers suffer long-lasting earnings losses is a stylized 
fact, raising the question whether these losses are replaced by other means. For 
married men, increased labour supply by the wife may be one way. Another 
possibility is that the public welfare system offsets the same losses. I used a Swedish 
longitudinal data set containing married couples where the husband was either 
employed or made redundant in 1987 by an establishment closure. There was no 
evidence that husbands‟ job loss positively affected wives‟ annual earnings. 
Although husbands‟ utilization of unemployment insurance increased significantly, 
government transfers including also sickness insurance, disability insurance, and 
means-tested social benefits, did not fully replace husbands‟ long-run earnings 
losses. Hence, displaced workers seem to suffer also from long-lasting losses in 
family income, which in many respects is a better measure of economic welfare than 
individual earnings or wages. 
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1   Introduction 
This paper examines the long-run effects of job displacement in Sweden on family 
income and on potential income replacement by increased spousal earnings and 
welfare state transfers. Several studies, during the last two decades, have shown that 
the earnings losses from job loss are not only temporary but last for many years 
(Ruhm, 1991; Jacobson et al., 1993; Stevens, 1997; Couch, 2001; Eliason & Storrie, 
2006). That job loss seems to lower earnings persistently raises the question whether 
displaced workers are compensated by other means. One possible source of income 
replacement, for couples, is that the spouse enters the labour market or if already 
working increases the number of working hours (i.e., an “added worker effect”). 
Previous empirical literature on the added-worker effect (e.g., Lundberg, 1985; 
Maloney, 1987, 1991; Seitchik, 1991; Cullen & Gruber, 2000; Prieto-Rodríguez & 
Rodríguez-Gutiérrez, 2000; Nilsson, 2008) has shown that this possible source of 
income replacement within the family does not seem to be utilized to any larger 
extent or that the spouse face such employment constraints that this is not a viable 
option.
1
  
Another potential source of income replacem nt is social security; and, most 
importantly, for displaced workers unemployment insurance. However, the 
unemployment insurance is designed to cover income losses during a transitional 
period of unemployment, but as discussed above displaced workers suffer long-
lasting earnings losses, i.e., even after re-employment they have lower levels of 
                                                 
1
 Most of this literature have focused on wives‟ labour supply response to their husband‟s current 
unemployment, and have then ignored any response before or after the occurrence of job loss. An 
exception is Stephens (2002) who showed that long-run increases in spousal labour supply 
compensated for over 25 percent of husbands‟ lost income due to job displacement. 
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earning than they otherwise would have had. There are other compensation schemes, 
however, for workers temporarily, or permanently, out of employment, such as 
disability and sickness insurance, and means-tested social benefits.  
Relatively little is known about the impact of job displacement on a household‟s 
economic well-being apart from the impact on the displaced workers‟ own earnings 
or wages. Even though studies focusing on wages, or earnings, have had a central 
role in the displaced worker literature, family income may in many respects be a 
better measure of economic welfare (Björklund & Palme, 2000; Seitchik, 1991). Two 
US studies have previously investigated the impact on family income. Stephens 
(2001) showed that total family income was less volatile than the head‟s earnings 
following job displacement and that focusing on individual income or earnings will 
overestimate the overall impact on economic wellbeing. Seitchik (1991) found that 
both increased spousal earnings and government transfers replaced some of the 
displaced husband‟s earnings, but that the replacement rate on average was rather 
small.   
The current study differs from previous work in several respects. It focuses solely 
on job displacement due to plant (i.e., establishment) closure. A plant closure can be 
viewed, at least to some extent, as a natural experiment as all workers are laid off 
irrespective of their characteristics. Thus, one is more likely to estimate causal 
effects of job loss not contaminated by selection bias. I will also explicitly 
investigate the impact of husbands‟ job displacement not only on family income but 
on several potential sources of income replacement: increased earnings by the wife; 
both spouses‟ utilization of unemployment insurance, sickness insurance, and 
disability insurance, as well as family means-tested social assistance. Moreover, a 
Swedish longitudinal data set is used and as Sweden has been pointed to as an 
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example of the universal welfare state in practice (Esping-Andersen, 1990) this may 
produce different findings from those in, for example, the US. Moreover, the high 
female labour force participation in Sweden, and that both spouses are expected to be 
self-supportive within marriage, may suggest that the labour supply of married 
women in Sweden is even less responsive than elsewhere to changes in their 
husband‟s earnings.     
 
2  The Swedish labour market and social security system  
During the period under study, dramatic changes took place in the state of the 
Swedish labour market, which needs to be borne in mind when interpreting the 
results. Below, I will give a very brief description of the Swedish labour market and 
of each of the income compensation schemes.  
 
2.1 The Swedish labour market
2
 
In 1987 when the job losses occurred, Sweden was in a period of remarkably low 
unemployment. The unemployment rate had been falling since 1983 and in 1989 it 
was down at 1.5 percent, while the employment rate, during the same period, rose 
continually from 79.0 to 82.9 percent. During the years that followed, Sweden 
experienced the most severe recession since the 1930s. The unemployment rate rose 
to 8.2 percent in 1993 and stayed about this level until 1997, and the employment 
rate fell by more than ten percentage points to 72.6 percent. Thus, the displaced 
workers faced a very buoyant labour market at the time of the job loss, with good 
opportunities to find new jobs quickly, before they had to face the impending 
recession.  
                                                 
2
 See Holmlund (2003) for more details. 
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 5 
Sweden is also internationally recognized for its high degree of women in the labour 
force. During these years, the labour force participation was almost as high for 
women as for men and in 1990 it peaked at 82.3 percent after rising for decades. The 
increase was then halted by the economic crisis and subsequently fell to 73.9 percent 
in 1998. Similarly, the female employment rate fell from 81.0 percent in 1990 to 69.4 
percent in 1998. Although there were only small differences between the 
employment rates of men and women, it should be noted that the employed women 
were mainly working part time.   
 
2.2 The Swedish social security system
3
 
The social security system in Sweden aims at providing universal financial security 
and its structure is potentially of significant importance for both the labour supply 
response of married women to their husbands‟ job loss, or unemployment, and the 
real economic losses for families experiencing job loss. The social security system 
offers four income sources of particular interest for displaced workers in working 
ages: unemployment insurance, sickness insurance, disability insurance, and means-
tested social assistance.
4
 
Unemployment insurance is, of course, the key welfare state transfer for job losers 
of working age. It will not only reduce income losses during periods of 
unemployment, but it may also reduce the longer-term impact of job loss by allowing 
for extended job search resulting in better-quality matches. Payment of 
unemployment insurance is conditional on registration with the public employment 
                                                 
3
 See Bergmark and Palme (2003) or Sjögren Lindquist and Wadensjö (2006) for a more thorough 
description of the development and details of the Swedish social security system. 
4 Unemployment insurance is actually not a part of the social insurance system in Sweden but comes 
under labour market policy. 
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service and the recipient must be available for work and actively seek job. 
Entitlement is also associated with a work condition. Those not qualified for 
unemployment insurance could be granted unemployment assistance instead. During 
the time period covered here the unemployment insurance system was changed 
several times and the benefit level varied between 80 and 90 percent of previous 
earnings up to a ceiling.  
Considering the massive literature showing an association between job loss 
(unemployment) and ill health,
5
 sickness and disability insurance may also be 
important sources of income amongst displaced workers. Sickness insurance is 
payable in cases of temporary illness that reduces working capacity. Just like the 
unemployment insurance, it replaces a share of lost earnings up to a ceiling and for 
most of the period the replacement ratio was the same as for the unemployment 
insurance, whereas the ceiling has consistently been higher. 
In case of a more permanently reduced working capacity, a person could be 
eligible for disability insurance. However, until 1991 persons aged at least 60 years 
could also be granted disability insurance for labour market reasons only and until 
1997 for a combination of health and labour market reasons. Thereafter, only 
medical reasons for the reduced working capacity should be considered. The income 
ceiling for disability insurance has been the same as for sickness insurance, but the 
replacement rate has been lower.  
Finally, means-tested social assistance will be the ultimate safety net for those 
otherwise unable to make a living. It is means-tested on a household basis and is 
supposed to guarantee a “reasonable standard of living.” To be entitled to social 
                                                 
5
 See Kasl and Jones (2000) for a review. 
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assistance, one should be unable to make a living on not only work, unemployment 
insurance, and other benefits, but also on assets.  
In addition to the social security schemes mentioned above, there are a number of 
supplementary schemes for unemployed workers. Initially, displaced workers have a 
stipulated right to a paid wage for a certain period after given notice. This is also the 
case if the business close down; then any wages not paid by the firm are covered by a 
state wage guarantee. There are also a number of security agreements between 
employer organisations and trade union organisations entitling redundant workers to 
severance pay. The trade union organisations also provide both collective and 
individual unemployment insurance compensating for forgone income above the 
ceiling in the unemployment insurance scheme. A majority of all workers are 
covered by these collective agreements and similar insurance schemes also exist in 
the case of sickness and disability.  
None of the supplementary schemes will be explicitly included in the following 
analysis due to the difficulty to identify such payments in the data. Unfortunately, 
some of them will be implicitly included, since according to Statistics Sweden at 
least some of the supplementary unemployment insurances will show up as earnings 
in the administrative registers. Hence, estimates of the earnings losses from job loss 
are likely to be underestimated and any estimates of the income replacement from 
social security should be interpreted as the part replaced by the public social security 
system alone.    
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3 Data, method, and estimations  
3.1 Data 
The data used here is linked employee-employer data containing all couples where 
the husband was displaced in 1987, as well as a random sample of comparable 
couples where the husbands were not displaced in this year. To create the data set 
three registers (i.e., the Register Based Labour Market Statistics; the Longitudinal 
Database for Education, Income and Occupation; and the Income and Wealth 
Register) were merged to obtain information on these couples for four pre-
displacement years (i.e., 1983-1986) and 13 post-displacement years (i.e., 1987-
1999).
6
  
The samples of married couples were constructed in four steps. First, all closing 
establishments with at least 10 employees were identified by the disappearance of 
their identity number from the administrative registers. The problem with „false firm 
deaths‟ (i.e., that the disappearance of the identity number is instead due to, for 
example, a change of owner) emphasiz d in Kuhn (2002) was eliminated by 
Statistics Sweden by also surveying the firm. 
In a second step, the workers corresponding to these establishments were 
identified by linking individual data to establishment data.
7
 A worker was defined as 
                                                 
6
 Income taxation and the administration of the universal Swedish welfare state provide the source for 
many of the variables in these registers. The employer files all wage payments to the tax authorities 
and, as practically all transfers in the Swedish welfare state, such as disability insurance, and sickness 
and unemployment benefits, are liable to tax the National Social Insurance Board also files income 
statements on such transfers (together with non-taxable social assistance payments). 
7
 Registers can be merged and one can link employees to their establishments since every resident and 
every establishment in Sweden has a unique identity number (i.e., a civic registration number or an 
Page 9 of 32
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 9 
displaced if employed at a closing establishment in November 1986, but no longer in 
November 1987.
8
 This definition assumes that all separations were related to closure. 
However, separations may be voluntary quits unrelated to the closure; pre-emptive 
quits, i.e., quits due to the expectation of closure; and actual displacements, i.e., 
where notice was served on the termination of the employment contact. Thus, using 
administrative data, any definition of displaced workers will probably also include 
certain voluntary quits unrelated to the closure.  
A comparison group was constructed in a third step as a random sample of 
married men who were employed in November of 1986 at non-closing 
establishments with at least 10 employees. However, some of these workers could 
have lost a job in 1987 for other reasons or have been displaced in any subsequent 
year. 
In a fourth step, all married male workers were linked to their spouse. This was 
possible since there is joint taxation of wealth for married couples in Sweden and 
Statistics Sweden collects the administrative records from the National Tax Board. 
The same information could therefore be attained for both spouses. 
                                                                                                                                          
organization number) and that the obligatory income statements filed to the taxation authorities by the 
employer, contain both these numbers. 
8
 This ensures that all displaced workers were employed at the same point in time as the workers in 
the comparison group and implies that for closures in 1987, only those who were displaced in the 
closing year were included in the sample and for closures in 1988, only those displaced during the 
calendar year before final closure given that the closing process was deemed longer than a year. The 
length of each individual closing process was determined ad hoc based on establishment size and 
worker flows during the three years preceding the closure. Most of the closing processes, however, 
were considered less than a calendar year.  
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Finally, I constrained the sample to couples were both spouses were of age 25-51 yrs 
in the end of 1986, had non-missing information for all baseline variables, and had 
been married during the four baseline years. The age restriction ensures that both 
spouses were of working age during the full follow-up period, while the latter 
restriction ensures that the baseline variables correspond to the two spouses as a 
married couple. After applying these restrictions 1,122 displaced and 29,934 non-
displaced couples remained. 
 
3.2   Method 
The focus on displacements due to plant closures only, is likely to reduce any 
selection problems. One can argue that an establishment closure is close to a natural 
experiment as all workers are separated from their jobs irrespective of their 
individual characteristics and behaviour. Nonetheless, there will be differences 
between displaced and non-displaced workers, since closures are not randomly 
distributed over the economy.
9
 In the displaced worker literature (e.g., Jacobson et al. 
1993; Margolis, 1999; Huttunen et al., 2006), a fixed-effect regression model 
including both lagged and leading dummy variables of the incidence of job 
displacement, have become standard when examining wage and earnings effects of 
job displacement. This model exploits the panel dimension of the data in that it 
control for unobserved time-invariant variables and allows the impact of job loss to 
set in even before the actual job loss and to be long lasting. Here, I will combine the 
                                                 
9
 See Falck (2007) for an empirical study of the impact of regional conditions on firm survival.  
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fixed-effect estimator with propensity score and inverse-probability-of-censoring 
weighting.
10
  
By propensity score weighting, one will ideally obtain a pseudo-sample where the 
distribution of observed characteristics is the same in the sample of displaced and 
non-displaced couples. The propensity score (p
D
) is the probability of treatment 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983), i.e., displacement, which is usually not known but has 
to be estimated; here by a logit model: , ,[ 1| ]
D
i i baseline i baselinep Pr D X  
1
0 1 ,{1 ( )}i baselineXexp , where Di,baseline is an indicator taking the value 1 if 
worker i was displaced at baseline and 0 otherwise, and Xbaseline is a vector of 
baseline covariates. To estimate the effect on those actually displaced, couple i is 
then assigned a weight (1 ) / (1 )D D Di i i i iD D p p .
11
 Hence, all displaced 
couples are assigned a weight equal to one, while each non-displaced couple j is 
assigned a weight equal to / (1 )D Dj jp p .  
As Charles and Stephens (2004) recognizes, a study which focuses on couples 
who remain married for the whole study period is likely to underestimate true family 
adjustment due to job loss, as couples who remain married are likely to be those who 
had to make the least adjustment to the job loss.
12
 To adjust for this I will adopt an 
additional, but similar weighting strategy, i.e., inverse-probability-of-censoring-
weighting, proposed by Robins and Rotnitzky (1995). While the job loss is viewed as 
                                                 
10
 See Hirano and Imbens (2001) for their suggested propensity score weighted regression and Robins 
and Rotnitzky (1995) for their inverse-probability-of-censoring weighted estimator.  
11
 See Hirano and Imbens (2001). 
12
 Divorce is not the only reason for a couple to be censored; marriages also dissolve upon the death of 
a spouse, and even though migration of one or both spouses does not necessarily mean that the 
marriage is dissolved they are no longer observed in the data. 
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a point treatment (i.e., it is assumed to occur at the baseline and the baseline only), 
censoring may occur in any year during the post-displacement period. Thus, the 
conditional probability of being censored is estimated for each year by a pooled logit 
model: , , , 1 , , , 1[ 1| 0, , , ]
C
i t i t i t i baseline i baseline i tp Pr C C D X Z
 
4 1
0 1 , 2 , 1 3 ,1
{1 ( )}k ki baseline i t i baseline t tkexp X Z D I , where Ct is a 
censoring indicator, Xbaseline is again a vector of baseline variables, Zt-1 a vector of 
lagged time-varying variables, and
k
baseline tD I  indicates time relative to baseline 
displacement (i.e., it is equal one if baseline displacement occurred k years prior to 
year t). The inverse-probability-of-censoring weights can then be defined as 
1
, ,0
{1 }
tC C
i t i kk
p .
13
 
The derived propensity score and censoring weights can then be used to construct 
the final weights as , ,
D C
i t i i t , which will be applied to a weighted fixed-effect 
regression:
4
, , , ,3
k k
i t i t i baseline t t i i tk
y W D I , where yt is either 
earnings or transfers, Wt a vector of time-varying variables unaffected by the 
displacement, and t  and i  are time and couple specific effects, respectively. 
Finally, 
k
baseline tD I  indicates as before time relative to baseline displacement. It allows 
the estimated impact of displacement ( k ) to set in three years prior to the actual 
displacement and vary by year up to three years after displacement and is then 
assumed to be constant. 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Instead applying the „stabilized‟ inverse-probability-of-censoring-weights, also proposed by Robins 
and Rotnitzky (1995), does not alter any results in the following analysis. 
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3.3  Choice of conditioning variables 
The baseline variables included in the estimation of the probability of job loss and of 
the probability of being censored were the same. Included were both spouses‟ age 
(third order); indicators of being foreign born, attained education (8 categories), and 
industry sector (10 categories); indicators of non-zero income, and the amounts, from 
employment (incl. self-employment), unemployment insurance, sickness insurance, 
and disability insurance; number of children aged 0–6 yrs and 7–17 yrs; county of 
residence (21 counties); and the couples incidence and total amount of taxable wealth 
and means-tested social assistance. The estimation of the probability of being 
censored included time-varying measures of county of residence and all income 
measures except for taxable wealth, which were not available for all years, while the 
estimation of the outcome equation only included county of residence and the 
spouses ages (third order).  
        
3.4  Descriptive statistics and balancing test 
Before examining the results, we will assess the degree of covariate balance. To 
compare comparable people, has been shown to be important in reducing selection 
bias in evaluation studies (Heckman et al., 1999). To investigate whether comparable 
samples have been obtained with respect to the baseline covariates, the differences in 
terms of standardized differences in means (SDM) were calculated for each single 
baseline (Table A2).
14
 
15
 The most pronounced pre-displacement differences between 
                                                 
14
 Various other balancing tests have been suggested in the literature (Smith & Todd, 2005), but there 
is no consensus on which of them to apply. 
15
 The standardized difference in means is the difference in covariate means between the displaced 
couples and the weighted non-displaced couples, in percentage of the pooled standard deviation 
(before weighting) of that covariate. 
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the two un-weighted samples correspond to differences in economic sector where the 
husbands were employed. As can be expected, a much smaller share of the displaced 
men were employed in community, social, and personal services, containing much of 
the public sector, while they to a larger extent were employed in the construction 
sector and financial intermediation, real estate, renting, or business activities. Other 
pronounced differences are lower earnings, and more experiences of unemployment 
among the displaced husbands.  
The average of the absolute values of the SDMs before the propensity score 
weighting was 6.99, while after weighting it decreased considerably to 0.36. The 
largest absolute value of SDM for a single covariate decreased from 38.75 to 1.80. 
As an absolute value of 20 was considered substantial in Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1985), while less than 10 was considered small in Normand, Landrum, Guadagnoli, 
Ayanian, Ryan, Cleary et al. (2001), this would suggest that the two samples were 
not that disparate even before the propensity score weighting, but that weighting the 
non-displaced couples, nonetheless, considerable reduced any imbalances.  
 
4 Results 
4.1 The impact of husbands’ job loss on both spouses earnings  
A natural point of departure would be to first make a convincing case that the job 
losses produced a shock to earnings of married men. Table 1 (left column) presents 
the estimates of husbands‟ job loss on own annual earnings in thousand Swedish 
kronor (SEK). All amounts are deflated to the 1999 values using the consumer price 
index.  
There was a decline in annual earnings, although statistically non-significant, in 
the year immediately preceding the job loss similar to what have been found in 
Page 15 of 32
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 15 
previous studies (e.g., Jacobson et al., 1993). As expected there was then a large drop 
in the displacement year corresponding to 9,325 SEK (4.1 %) and it dropped even 
further to more than 13,000 SEK (5.6 %) in the following year.
16
 Although the 
negative impact seems to have diminished somewhat in the next year, this recovery 
was only temporary. During the last nine years, the annual losses were more than 
14,000 SEK (6.2 %). The larger long-run effects might be explained by the severe 
recession, in the early 1990s, during which it has been argued that displaced workers 
were more likely to once again lose their jobs (Eliason and Storrie, 2006).
17
  
After having established that job loss inflicted rather large and persistent losses in 
married men‟s earnings we proceed to the main part of the paper investigating 
whether these losses were replaced by other means. One possibility would be that the 
wife either entered the labour market or if already working increased hours of work 
(i.e., an added worker effect) to compensate the reduction in family income arising 
from the husband‟s job loss. Although wives‟ hours of work are not observed in the 
data their annual earnings are. Changes in annual earnings may only approximately 
correspond to changes in labour supply, but analyzing earnings data can answer the 
perhaps more important question whether the wiv s were able to replace the losses 
inflicted on their husbands‟ earnings.  
>>TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE<< 
The earnings estimates for the wives are for most years statistically non-significant 
and in the initial years around the husband‟s job loss the estimates are also very close 
to zero. From the second post-displacement year and onwards the earnings of wives 
                                                 
16
 The presented relative effects are calculated by dividing the estimate by the difference between the 
weighted mean for the displaced workers and the same estimate. 
17
 Stevens (1997) also showed that the main cause of the long-term effects of job loss on earnings was 
attributable to higher risks of subsequent job losses.  
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to displaced men was actually negatively affected, opposite to what one would have 
expected a priori, although statistically significant only in the third post-
displacement year. Thus, it can be concluded that wives did not replace any of the 
earnings losses of their husbands. The dip in the second post-displacement year 
coincided with the temporary recovery of husbands‟ earnings, which possibly could 
signify an adjustment by the couple to improve the husband‟s employment, or 
earnings, opportunities at the expense of the wife‟s earnings. One potential such 
adjustment would be that they moved to maximize the husband‟s earnings potential 
and the wife, as the secondary earner, would then be considered a tied mover.   
 
4.2 Displaced couples’ utilization of the social security system  
As the earnings losses that married men suffered from job loss, do not seem to have 
been replaced by increased labour supply of the wife one can then ask whether the 
couples instead were able to offset these losses by making use of the public social 
security system. In the following, I will present the results from investigating the 
impact of husband‟s job loss on the couples‟ utilization of four kinds of social 
security: unemployment insurance, sickness insurance, disability insurance, and 
means-tested social benefits. Although the Swedish public social security system 
encompasses also other benefits, those have to be regarded less important for couples 
in working age. However, the supplementary insurance schemes briefly mentioned 
above have recently been pointed to as important elements in the Swedish welfare 
state (Sjögren Lindquist & Wadensjö, 2006).  
Starting with the utilization of unemployment insurance (Table 2), there was a 
large increase in the received amount of unemployment insurance by the husband in 
the year of the job loss. In monetary terms, it corresponds to about 6,400 SEK (428.8 
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%) offsetting almost 70 percent of the earnings loss. During the next three years, 
however, there was a sharp decrease in the utilization of unemployment insurance, 
which ceased abruptly in the following year and then even reversed. The longer run 
impact corresponds to roughly a 4,700 SEK (60.5 %) increase in annually received 
unemployment insurance. Although it is possible that husbands‟ unemployment 
insurance crowded-out any immediate added-worker effect, this is an unlikely 
explanation of the lack of adjustment of wives‟ labour supply in the longer run. 
Moreover, neither the lack of response in wives‟ labour supply (i.e., annual earnings) 
during the first years nor the following decrease in earnings can be explained by 
higher utilization of unemployment insurance amongst the wives.  
>>TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE<< 
A significant number of studies have found an association between job loss and ill 
health. Not only may the loss of a job be stressful because of long-lasting earnings 
losses but it may also entail the loss of social networks and time structure, threatened 
self-esteem and self-confidence, and possibly altered family relations and increased 
family tensions. Some of the distress associated to job loss has been shown to extend 
also to other family members.
18
 Thus, it seems natural to investigate whether 
increased sickness or disability can be a partial explanation of either married men‟s 
long-lasting earnings losses or wives‟ lack of adjustment. As can be seen in the left 
columns of Table 3 and 4, there was no immediate impact of job loss on husbands‟ 
own utilization of either sickness or disability insurance. This is the expected result 
when it comes to disability pension, but if one believes that job loss has adverse 
health effects, one should perhaps have expected increased sickness. This does not 
necessarily mean that job loss did not adversely affect health, as those unemployed 
                                                 
18
 For a review, see Jones (1992) or Ström (2003). 
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may just not have bothered to report sick. However, there is, at least an indication, of 
a long-run effect on the utilization of disability insurance corresponding to an annual 
increase of 1,281 SEK (18.8 %). Although the possibility to be granted disability 
insurance partly for labour market reasons was exhausted in 1997, this would still 
have been a possibility for some of the workers here. Thus, any increased utilization 
of disability pension cannot be viewed in terms of deterioration in health only but 
also in terms of sustained labour market difficulties.
19
 The impact on wives‟ 
utilization of sickness and disability insurance was only minor and in no case 
statistically significant. 
>>TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE<< 
>>TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE<< 
The final type of social security investigated here is also the ultimate safety net for 
the unemployed. Although the overall utilization of means-tested social assistance 
increased dramatically in Sweden during the 1990s, one would not expect this source 
of income to be dominating in a sample of workers who all have previously been 
employed and so insured. It is, nonetheless, interesting to examine to what extent job 
loss increased the utilization of means-tested social assistance, since receiving it can 
be viewed as an indicator of officially recognized economic hardship (Stenberg, 
1998).
20
 
However, the estimates reveal only a minor, and statistically non-significant, 
impact of husband‟s job loss on the couple's utilization of means-tested social 
                                                 
19
 For the Netherlands it has been found that approximately one quarter of the disability insurance 
enrolment was hidden unemployment (Koning & van Vuuren, 2007).  
20
 Since the shame or social stigma associated to receiving means-tested social assistance implies that 
not all of those who are poor enough to be eligible actually apply, any measure based on receiving 
social assistance is likely to underestimate the true degree of economic hardship (Stenberg, 1998).  
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assistance (Table 5). Thus, albeit the previous results have indicated that displaced 
married men suffered long-lasting earnings losses it seems that job displacements in 
Sweden, and at this time, did not lead to widespread severe economic hardship for 
the displaced workers or their families. 
>>TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE<< 
Finally, I will summarize by showing, also in Table 5 (right), the impact of job loss 
on annual pre-tax family income.
21
 Although the immediate loss of husbands‟ own 
earnings transmits to a large loss in family income, job loss seem to have long-lasting 
economic impact even when including wife‟s income and income from 
unemployment, sickness, and disability insurance, and means-tested social benefits. 
From the second post-displacement year and to the end of the observation period, 
eleven years later, the loss in family income before taxes were more than 9,600 SEK 
(2.5 %) each year. 
 
4.3 Robustness checks and the impact of censoring 
As a check of robustness of the results to the choice of estimator, the fixed-effect 
regressions were re-estimated without applying the propensity score and inverse-
probability-of-censoring weights. I argued in Section 3, that not taking censoring into 
account may produce biased estimates, as censoring occurs by the dissolution of the 
couple (either by divorce, death, or migration) and one would expect these couples to 
                                                 
21
 The measure of family income is not equivalent to total disposable family income but is the before 
tax sum of both spouses‟ earnings and the transfers investigated here. As stated above the exclusion of 
any supplementary benefits are likely to overestimate any adverse impact although diminished by the 
fact that some of these benefits show up as earnings in the data. The use of family income before 
taxes, on the other hand, will probably overestimate the same effects to some extent as the progressive 
income tax is likely to offset some of the differences. 
Page 20 of 32
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 20 
be the ones to have required the most adjustments to the job loss. However, the 
estimates obtained then not applying the inverse-probability-of-censoring weights 
(Table A2) are very close to those presented earlier. Table A3 shows the 
corresponding estimates when the fixed effect estimator is applied without both 
inverse-probability-of-censoring weights and propensity score weights. These 
estimates differ somewhat more and then especially the long-run estimates. In 
comparison, the estimates presented in the main analysis are in most cases the more 
conservative, while the unweighted estimates suggest that there are statistically 
significant long-run effects of job loss on both husbands‟ and wives‟ earnings, family 
income, as well as husbands‟ utilization of all three insurances.    
 
5 Summary and discussion 
This paper has explored to which extent married men‟s earnings losses, following 
involuntary job loss, were replaced by either increased earnings by the wife or by 
transfers from the public social security system. The empirical evidence on these 
matters is sparse, although a vast literature establishes long-lasting earnings losses 
following job loss.  
Job displacement among the married men in this study seems to have inflicted 
substantial long-run earnings losses. This would suggest incentives for increased 
labour supply by the wife to offset these losses. However, no such adjustment is 
evident. If anything, the wives of the displaced men experience on average lower 
earnings. A number of explanations have been suggested, in the literature to why an 
added worker effect have not been established empirically, such as disincentives 
from means-tested social insurances, both spouses are more likely to lose their job 
due to assortative mating, shared restrictions stemming from common labour market 
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circumstances, and that spouses have preferences in favour of joint leisure (Doris, 
1999; Prieto-Rodríguez & Rodríguez-Gutiérrez, 2000). Most of these explanations, 
however, can be ruled out here. Unemployment insurance is not given on family 
basis in Sweden and neither did government transfers replace a major part of 
husbands‟ long-run earnings losses. The exclusive focus on job displacements due to 
establishment closure should reasonably exclude also assortative mating as a 
plausible explanation. A potential explanation, not explicitly mentioned in the 
literature on the added worker effect, is that job loss may affects wives‟ health, and 
especially mental health, which could adversely affect her productivity and work 
absenteeism. Although the possibility that such a mechanism was at work cannot be 
rejected, it is not supported by an increase in wives‟ sickness insurance.   
To conclude, neither do wives‟ labour supply work as insurance for long-lasting 
earnings losses following married men‟s job displacement nor does the social 
security system offset the major part of these losses; the long-run losses in family 
income amount to almost 10,000 SEK. As the impact on individual earnings (the 
measure most frequently used in previous studies) does not necessarily reflect the 
real economic impact on the individual, this adds to the current knowledge on the 
individual and family welfare costs of worker displacement. Moreover, married 
men‟s job loss did not only increase their utilization of unemployment insurance but 
there is also an indication of an increased utilization of disability insurance in the 
long run. Although many studies have shown adverse health effects from involuntary 
job loss, the increased utilization of disability insurance does not necessarily confirm 
such negative health effects as disability insurance was granted also for labour 
market reasons.  
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No increase in utilization of social assistance was found, however, which would 
suggest that job loss in Sweden during these years did not cause widespread severe 
economic hardship at least. However, as displaced workers lose their jobs not by 
fault, or behaviour, but due to economic, and structural, change beneficial to the 
economy overall, the failure of both the family and the welfare state to replace their 
lost earning suggests that displaced workers and their families bear the costs of 
increased welfare for all.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Estimates of the impact of married men‟s job loss on their own, and their wives‟, annual 
earnings in thousand Swedish kronor (SEK). 1,000 SEK  €107. 
 Husband‟s Earnings  Wife‟s  Earnings  
Years before/after displacement Coef.  (S.E.)  Coef.  (S.E.)  
Three years before 0.056  (1.877)  0.083  (1.083)  
Two years before 0.155  (2.040)  -0.071  (1.407)  
One year before -2.142  (2.283)  0.409  (1.574)  
Year of displacement -9.247  (2.879)  -0.373  (1.836)  
One year after -13.212  (3.201)  -1.070  (1.958)  
Two years after -10.783  (3.291)  -3.546  (2.130)  
Three years after -12.395  (3.445)  -4.457  (2.187)  
4-12 years after  -14.200  (4.299)  -2.979  (2.340)  
 
Table 2. Estimates of the impact of married men‟s job loss on own and wives‟ amount of annually 
received unemployment insurance (UI) in thousand Swedish kronor (SEK). 1,000 SEK  €107. 
 Husband‟s UI  Wife‟s UI  
Years before/after displacement Coef.  (S.E.)  Coef.  (S.E.)  
Three years before -0.054  (0.422)  -0.018  (0.319)  
Two years before -0.038  (0.508)  0.028  (0.378)  
One year before 1.177  (0.522)  0.468  (0.445)  
Year of displacement 6.406  (0.783)  1.091  (0.555)  
One year after 3.939  (0.729)  0.237  (0.488)  
Two years after 1.578  (0.586)  -0.133  (0.493)  
Three years after 1.385  (0.560)  -0.043  (0.403)  
4-12 years after  4.611  (0.884)  0.767  (0.631)  
 
Table 3. Estimates of the impact of married men‟s job loss on own and the wife‟s amount of annually 
received sickness insurance (SI) in thousand Swedish kronor (SEK). 1,000 SEK  €107. 
 Husband‟s SI  Wife‟s SI  
Years before/after displacement Coef.  (S.E.)  Coef.  (S.E.)  
Three years before -0.023  (0.365)  0.011  (0.340)  
Two years before -0.027  (0.532)  -0.001  (0.409)  
One year before 0.918  (0.678)  0.255  (0.503)  
Year of displacement -0.245  (0.798)  0.616  (0.694)  
One year after -0.424  (0.878)  0.553  (0.777)  
Two years after -0.029  (0.914)  1.016  (0.859)  
Three years after 1.213  (1.057)  0.352  (0.861)  
4-12 years after  0.714  (0.571)  -0.290  (0.457)  
 
Table 4. Estimates of the impact of married men‟s job loss on own and the wife‟s amount of annually 
received disability insurance (DI) in thousand Swedish kronor (SEK). 1,000 SEK  €107. 
 Husband‟s DI  Wife‟s DI  
Years before/after displacement Coef.  (S.E.)  Coef.  (S.E.)  
Three years before 0.013  (0.021)  0.006  (0.120)  
Two years before -0.004  (0.029)  0.009  (0.173)  
One year before 0.039  (0.111)  -0.137  (0.220)  
Year of displacement -0.012  (0.204)  -0.162  (0.275)  
One year after 0.025  (0.339)  -0.211  (0.321)  
Two years after -0.045  (0.441)  0.075  (0.448)  
Three years after -0.287  (0.706)  0.068  (0.642)  
4-12 years after  1.434  (0.870)  0.179  (0.669)  
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Table 5. Estimates of the impact of married men‟s job loss on amount of annually received means-
tested social benefits and annual family income in thousand Swedish kronor (SEK). 1,000 SEK  
€107. 
 Couple‟s SA  Couple‟s Total Income  
Years before/after displacement Coef.  (S.E.)  Coef.  (S.E.)  
Three years before 0.022  (0.172)  0.096  (2.184)  
Two years before 0.040  (0.235)  0.090  (2.495)  
One year before 0.273  (0.265)  1.261  (2.721)  
Year of displacement 0.212  (0.220)  -1.713  (3.132)  
One year after 0.407  (0.223)  -9.754  (3.562)  
Two years after 0.259  (0.224)  -11.607  (3.779)  
Three years after 0.143  (0.292)  -14.022  (3.832)  
4-12 years after  0.139  (0.286)  -9.625  (4.498)  
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Appendix   
 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics, for displaced (D=1) and non-displaced couples (D=0), and balancing 
test of baseline covariates before and after propensity score weighting. 
 Unweighted sample 
(means) 
 Weighted sample  
(means) 
Baseline variables D=1 D=0 ASDM  D=1 D=0 ASDM  
Demographic variables in 1986        
Husband‟s Age (yrs) 40.696 40.929 3.84  40.696 40.687 0.14 
Wife‟s age (yrs) 38.335 38.790 7.51  38.335 38.321 0.23 
Husband foreign born (0/1) 0.151 0.099 15.60  0.151 0.152 0.40 
Wife foreign born (0/1) 0.155 0.108 14.00  0.155 0.157 0.49 
Children aged 0-6 yrs (no.) 0.504 0.492 1.58  0.504 0.507 0.45 
Children aged 7-17 yrs (no.) 0.841 0.831 1.41  0.841 0.842 0.19 
Husband's education in 1986 (0/1)        
Unknown education  0.051 0.034 8.56  0.051 0.051 0.18 
Compulsory school, < 9 yrs  0.242 0.205 8.88  0.242 0.243 0.14 
Compulsory school, 9 yrs 0.102 0.094 2.44  0.102 0.102 0.17 
Upper secondary school, < 3 yrs 0.269 0.232 8.67  0.269 0.270 0.07 
Upper secondary school,  3-4 yrs 0.140 0.165 7.03  0.140 0.140 0.06 
Tertiary education < 3 yrs 0.104 0.102 0.85  0.104 0.104 0.05 
Tertiary education 3+ yrs 0.085 0.150 20.40  0.085 0.085 0.01 
PhD studies 0.005 0.017 11.41  0.005 0.005 0.01 
Wife's education in 1986 (0/1)        
Unknown education 0.061 0.037 10.79  0.061 0.062 0.50 
Compulsory school, < 9 yrs 0.184 0.161 5.90  0.184 0.183 0.11 
Compulsory school, 9 yrs 0.137 0.137 0.08  0.137 0.136 0.26 
Upper secondary school, < 3 yrs 0.347 0.338 1.75  0.347 0.346 0.24 
Upper secondary school,  3-4 yrs 0.079 0.070 3.42  0.079 0.079 0.06 
Tertiary education < 3 yrs 0.104 0.125 6.55  0.104 0.105 0.07 
Tertiary education 3+ yrs 0.085 0.125 13.21  0.085 0.085 0.11 
PhD studies 0.004 0.005 1.59  0.004 0.004 0.41 
Husband’s industry sector in 1986  (0/1)        
Unidentified or non-employed 0.002 0.002 1.09  0.002 0.002 0.35 
Agriculture, fishing, and forestry 0.041 0.012 18.50  0.041 0.040 0.87 
Mining and quarrying  0.000 0.007 11.80  0.000 0.000 0.00 
Manufacturing  0.377 0.364 2.77  0.377 0.377 0.10 
Electricity, gas, and water supply  0.017 0.020 1.95  0.017 0.017 0.01 
Construction 0.128 0.080 15.93  0.128 0.129 0.16 
Trade, restaurants and hotels   0.133 0.105 8.61  0.133 0.134 0.22 
Transport, storage, communication  0.085 0.091 2.06  0.085 0.085 0.03 
 Financing, insurance, real estate, etc 0.122 0.084 12.62  0.122 0.123 0.40 
 Community, social, personal services  0.095 0.237 38.75  0.095 0.095 0.09 
Wife's industry sector in 1986 (0/1)        
Unidentified or non-employed 0.137 0.114 6.98  0.137 0.137 0.04 
Agriculture, fishing, and forestry 0.009 0.006 3.45  0.009 0.009 0.09 
Mining and quarrying  0.003 0.001 2.99  0.003 0.003 0.40 
Manufacturing  0.112 0.108 1.51  0.112 0.112 0.12 
Electricity, gas, and water supply  0.000 0.003 8.19  0.000 0.000 0.00 
Construction 0.016 0.010 5.84  0.016 0.017 0.39 
Trade, restaurants and hotels   0.106 0.102 1.26  0.106 0.106 0.14 
Transport, storage, communication  0.040 0.036 2.01  0.040 0.040 0.07 
Financing, insurance, real estate, etc 0.069 0.068 0.23  0.069 0.069 0.06 
Community, social, personal services 0.508 0.552 8.75  0.508 0.509 0.14 
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Table A1. Cont'd. 
 Unweighted sample 
(means) 
 Weighted sample  
(means) 
Baseline variables D=1 D=0 ASDM  D=1 D=0 ASDM  
Region of residence in 1986 (0/1)        
Stockholm county 0.173 0.172 0.26  0.173 0.175 0.55 
Uppsala county 0.030 0.034 1.93  0.030 0.030 0.07 
Södermanland county 0.025 0.030 2.85  0.025 0.025 0.03 
Östergötland county 0.038 0.050 5.69  0.038 0.039 0.11 
Jönköping county 0.017 0.041 14.56  0.017 0.017 0.01 
Kronoberg county 0.020 0.024 3.09  0.020 0.019 0.42 
Kalmar county 0.019 0.029 6.86  0.019 0.019 0.24 
Gotland county 0.001 0.005 8.03  0.001 0.001 0.00 
Blekinge county 0.031 0.021 6.59  0.031 0.031 0.09 
Skåne county 0.090 0.130 12.70  0.090 0.090 0.11 
Halland county 0.053 0.031 10.93  0.053 0.053 0.22 
Västra Götaland county 0.207 0.172 8.92  0.207 0.207 0.17 
Värmland county 0.025 0.031 3.84  0.025 0.024 0.35 
Örebro county 0.051 0.032 9.41  0.051 0.051 0.02 
Västmanland county 0.052 0.034 8.79  0.052 0.052 0.10 
Dalarna county 0.053 0.031 10.85  0.053 0.049 1.79 
Gävleborg county 0.037 0.033 1.99  0.037 0.037 0.15 
Västernorrland county 0.006 0.031 18.26  0.006 0.006 0.02 
Jämtland county 0.004 0.010 7.46  0.004 0.004 0.04 
Västerbotten county 0.021 0.028 4.22  0.021 0.021 0.18 
Norrbotten county 0.049 0.032 8.41  0.049 0.050 0.26 
Husband’s labour market position in 1983        
Any earnings (0/1) 0.977 0.991 11.72  0.977 0.975 1.59 
Earnings (tSEK) 198.587 210.415 11.80  198.587 198.357 0.23 
Any unemployment insurance (0/1) 0.111 0.053 21.31  0.111 0.114 0.92 
Unemployment insurance (tSEK) 3.079 1.444 14.42  3.079 3.173 0.83 
Any sickness insurance (0/1) 0.611 0.621 2.15  0.611 0.607 0.64 
Sickness insurance (tSEK) 4.438 4.395 0.38  4.438 4.404 0.31 
Any disability insurance (0/1) 0.001 0.002 1.77  0.001 0.001 0.05 
Disability insurance (tSEK) 0.043 0.093 2.40  0.043 0.043 0.01 
Wife’s labour market position in 1983        
Any earnings (0/1) 0.883 0.902 6.09  0.883 0.882 0.36 
Earnings (tSEK) 91.138 96.429 8.23  91.138 91.041 0.15 
Any unemployment insurance (0/1) 0.096 0.069 9.81  0.096 0.097 0.16 
Unemployment insurance (tSEK) 2.423 1.849 5.70  2.423 2.438 0.16 
Any sickness insurance (0/1) 0.010 0.009 0.64  0.010 0.010 0.04 
Sickness insurance (tSEK) 0.706 0.662 0.58  0.706 0.709 0.04 
Any disability insurance (0/1) 0.642 0.616 5.24  0.642 0.640 0.29 
Disability insurance (tSEK) 4.304 4.052 2.20  4.304 4.267 0.32 
Husband’s labour market position in 1984        
Any earnings (0/1) 0.979 0.994 13.59  0.979 0.976 1.99 
Earnings (tSEK) 202.674 216.088 13.34  202.674 202.401 0.27 
Any unemployment insurance (0/1) 0.087 0.040 19.32  0.087 0.088 0.72 
Unemployment insurance (tSEK) 2.949 1.161 16.02  2.949 3.085 1.23 
Any sickness insurance (0/1) 0.600 0.604 0.91  0.600 0.598 0.34 
Sickness insurance (tSEK) 4.993 4.579 3.24  4.993 4.991 0.01 
Any disability insurance (0/1) 0.001 0.002 3.14  0.001 0.001 0.03 
Disability insurance (tSEK) 0.042 0.121 3.38  0.042 0.042 0.01 
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Table A1. Cont'd. 
 Unweighted sample 
(means) 
 Weighted sample  
(means) 
Baseline variables D=1 D=0 ASDM  D=1 D=0 ASDM  
Wife’s labour market position in 1984        
Any earnings (0/1) 0.911 0.915 1.54  0.911 0.909 0.54 
Earnings (tSEK) 96.286 100.808 7.06  96.286 96.216 0.11 
Any unemployment insurance (0/1) 0.090 0.068 8.11  0.090 0.089 0.22 
Unemployment insurance (tSEK) 2.556 1.839 6.92  2.556 2.555 0.01 
Any sickness insurance (0/1) 0.012 0.011 0.66  0.012 0.012 0.00 
Sickness insurance (tSEK) 0.785 0.753 0.41  0.785 0.789 0.04 
Any disability insurance (0/1) 0.618 0.614 0.86  0.618 0.618 0.04 
Disability insurance (tSEK) 4.741 4.354 3.17  4.741 4.703 0.31 
Husband’s  labour market position in 1985        
Any earnings (0/1) 0.992 0.997 6.28  0.992 0.991 1.84 
Earnings (tSEK) 208.909 220.810 11.56  208.909 208.712 0.19 
Any unemployment insurance (0/1) 0.081 0.029 23.28  0.081 0.083 1.00 
Unemployment insurance (tSEK) 2.829 0.809 19.35  2.829 2.978 1.42 
Any sickness insurance (0/1) 0.613 0.642 6.01  0.613 0.614 0.08 
Sickness insurance (tSEK) 6.114 5.305 5.26  6.114 6.106 0.05 
Any disability insurance (0/1) 0.001 0.003 3.98  0.001 0.001 0.00 
Disability insurance (tSEK) 0.042 0.153 4.32  0.042 0.041 0.02 
Wife’s labour market position in 1985        
Any earnings (0/1) 0.921 0.926 2.05  0.921 0.920 0.44 
Earnings (tSEK) 98.696 103.574 7.70  98.696 98.794 0.15 
Any unemployment insurance (0/1) 0.088 0.066 8.20  0.088 0.088 0.15 
Unemployment insurance (tSEK) 2.368 1.773 5.83  2.368 2.317 0.50 
Any sickness insurance (0/1) 0.012 0.013 1.63  0.012 0.012 0.06 
Sickness insurance (tSEK) 0.860 0.927 0.78  0.860 0.857 0.03 
Any disability insurance (0/1) 0.654 0.651 0.63  0.654 0.653 0.18 
Disability insurance (tSEK) 4.957 4.813 1.06  4.957 4.926 0.23 
Couple’s assets in 1983        
Any social assistance (0/1) 0.032 0.022 6.12  0.032 0.034 1.25 
Social assistance (tSEK) 0.833 0.345 8.07  0.833 0.991 2.60 
Any taxable wealth (0/1) 0.068 0.084 6.17  0.068 0.068 0.05 
Taxable wealth (tSEK) 64.994 88.575 5.84  64.994 64.986 0.00 
Couple’s assets in 1984        
Any social assistance (0/1) 0.043 0.025 10.05  0.043 0.045 1.28 
Social assistance (tSEK) 1.053 0.385 9.89  1.053 1.195 2.10 
Any taxable wealth (0/1) 0.038 0.048 4.65  0.038 0.038 0.04 
Taxable wealth (tSEK) 47.607 59.458 3.07  47.607 48.291 0.18 
Couple’s assets in 1985        
Any social assistance (0/1) 0.042 0.023 10.71  0.042 0.044 1.22 
Social assistance (tSEK) 0.957 0.393 8.39  0.957 1.078 1.80 
Any taxable wealth (0/1) 0.049 0.060 4.70  0.049 0.049 0.23 
Taxable wealth (tSEK) 80.625 70.968 1.30  80.625 63.572 2.30 
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Table A2. Propensity score weighted fixed effect estimates of husbands‟ job displacement. 
 Husband‟s  Wife‟s  Couple‟s 
Years before/after 
displacement 
Earnings  UI  SI  DI  Earnings  UI  SI  DI  SA  Total Income 
Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.) 
Three years before 0.02 (1.87)  -0.05 (0.42)  -0.02 (0.36)  0.01 (0.02)  0.08 (1.08)  -0.02 (0.32)  0.01 (0.34)  0.01 (0.12)  0.02 (0.17)  0.05 (2.18) 
Two years before 0.11 (2.04)  -0.04 (0.51)  -0.02 (0.53)  0.00 (0.03)  -0.08 (1.41)  0.02 (0.38)  0.00 (0.41)  0.01 (0.17)  0.04 (0.23)  0.04 (2.49) 
One year before -2.19 (2.28)  1.17 (0.52)  0.92 (0.68)  0.04 (0.11)  0.39 (1.57)  0.47 (0.44)  0.25 (0.50)  -0.13 (0.22)  0.27 (0.26)  1.20 (2.72) 
Year of displacement -9.30 (2.87)  6.37 (0.78)  -0.26 (0.78)  0.02 (0.20)  -0.42 (1.83)  1.08 (0.55)  0.62 (0.69)  -0.16 (0.27)  0.21 (0.22)  -1.84 (3.12) 
One year after -13.30 (3.19)  3.95 (0.72)  -0.47 (0.84)  0.07 (0.33)  -1.07 (1.95)  0.23 (0.48)  0.51 (0.75)  -0.20 (0.32)  0.38 (0.22)  -9.88 (3.55) 
Two years after -10.89 (3.27)  1.57 (0.58)  0.03 (0.88)  0.00 (0.41)  -3.54 (2.12)  -0.12 (0.48)  1.03 (0.83)  0.05 (0.43)  0.23 (0.21)  -11.64 (3.77) 
Three years after -12.36 (3.42)  1.32 (0.55)  1.12 (1.01)  -0.20 (0.65)  -4.51 (2.17)  -0.01 (0.40)  0.39 (0.83)  0.15 (0.60)  0.14 (0.28)  -13.96 (3.82) 
4-12 years after  -14.05 (4.17)  4.67 (0.86)  0.72 (0.54)  1.16 (0.80)  -2.67 (2.29)  0.75 (0.61)  -0.19 (0.44)  0.13 (0.64)  0.16 (0.27)  -9.32 (4.37) 
 
Table A3. Unweighted fixed effect estimates of husbands‟ job displacement. 
 Husband‟s  Wife‟s  Couple‟s 
Years before/after 
displacement 
Earnings  UI  SI  DI  Earnings  UI  SI  DI  SA  Total Income 
Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.) 
Three years before -1.30 (1.84)  0.14 (0.39)  0.38 (0.36)  -0.05 (0.02)  0.86 (1.06)  0.13 (0.31)  0.15 (0.33)  -0.02 (0.12)  0.18 (0.16)  0.48 (2.14) 
Two years before 0.37 (1.98)  0.36 (0.47)  0.79 (0.52)  -0.12 (0.03)  0.54 (1.38)  0.01 (0.37)  -0.08 (0.40)  -0.12 (0.17)  0.08 (0.21)  1.83 (2.43) 
One year before -0.65 (2.19)  0.57 (0.48)  1.83 (0.66)  -0.11 (0.11)  0.31 (1.55)  0.53 (0.43)  0.50 (0.49)  -0.25 (0.21)  0.25 (0.23)  2.97 (2.64) 
Year of displacement -7.85 (2.82)  5.31 (0.76)  0.99 (0.76)  -0.07 (0.20)  -0.75 (1.81)  1.06 (0.54)  1.05 (0.67)  -0.23 (0.27)  -0.01 (0.17)  -0.50 (3.06) 
One year after -11.39 (3.12)  2.77 (0.70)  0.84 (0.81)  0.07 (0.32)  -1.21 (1.93)  0.27 (0.46)  1.04 (0.74)  -0.23 (0.31)  0.12 (0.17)  -7.72 (3.48) 
Two years after -8.96 (3.23)  0.19 (0.55)  1.29 (0.87)  0.11 (0.40)  -4.00 (2.10)  -0.17 (0.47)  1.81 (0.82)  0.15 (0.42)  -0.09 (0.16)  -9.65 (3.70) 
Three years after -12.44 (3.42)  -0.21 (0.52)  2.46 (1.00)  0.10 (0.63)  -5.92 (2.14)  -0.26 (0.39)  1.15 (0.81)  0.48 (0.58)  -0.38 (0.22)  -15.02 (3.78) 
4-12 years after  -16.89 (4.17)  5.06 (0.83)  1.29 (0.53)  1.88 (0.78)  -5.31 (2.25)  1.11 (0.60)  -0.08 (0.43)  0.89 (0.62)  -0.34 (0.21)  -12.40 (4.35) 
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